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1. Introduction
The fall of the Iron Curtain, which will ultimately result in the eastward enlargement of the EU, is very
much a regional problem, as the border regions will undergo concrete changes. Trade in services or
other goods consumed close to the location of production and daily commuting to the workplace,
educational institutions and shopping facilities are all examples of economic activities that will
influence growth in the border regions. Regional decision-makers and institutions responsible for
economic and regional policy are waiting for a response to the question whether the changes to
Europe’s eastern borders will have a positive or negative effect on economic growth in the border
regions. If negative effects predominate and the border regions turn out to be the losers in a game
with many winners,1 the capacity for compensation measures and the form these should take will
have to be discussed.
This paper will explore the significance of a national border for two determinants of regional
economic growth, namely foreign trade demand and investment activity. In this respect, the specific
effects of borders on growth in the border regions will firstly be discussed within the framework of
neo-classical growth theory and trade theories. Next, the consequences of the gradual removal of the
border on export and investment activities in the German border areas with Poland will be analysed.
These regions are part of the East German Objective-1 area which receives support from the EU
Structural Funds and they are in particular need of economic development. Following the empirical
analysis, regional policy strategies for border regions will be discussed and there will be a critical
assessment of the German and European regional policy which is being implemented. The border
naturally affects the economic growth of border regions in many further areas such as the regulation
of the cross-border mobility of workers, the extension and improvement of infrastructure, or
technology transfer across the border. These topics are not included here but will be explored in a
follow-up study.
The scope of the present study does not allow the empirical investigation to examine the regions on
both sides of the German-Polish border, as desirable as this would be. The focus here is therefore on
the German side of the border and the Polish side is only included where it would seem necessary to
explain or assess the procedures in the German border areas. The German regions along the border
will however be compared with each other. In the process, it will be possible to ascertain if and how
the border affects economic development in the border regions. In addition, regional features can be
taken into consideration and specific regional weaknesses established. Available statistical data and
the results of interviews conducted with decision-makers and administrative personnel in the border
regions in autumn 1998 will be used for this purpose.
As East Germany’s economic transformation from a socialist command economy to a market
economy is not yet over, the particularities of the transformation process have to be borne in mind
when interpreting the empirical information. One must also be aware that the regional policy
measures implemented in the border regions are not primarily geared towards supporting border
regions alone but are rather part of the regional policy for East German development and change as a
whole.
                                                                
1  This is a widespread fear of regional decision-makers in particular and used to support their basic argument
for more thorough economic assistance, documented for example in a list of requirements from the German
and Austrian Chambers of Handicrafts and Chambers of Trade and Commerce located at the borders with the
Central European accession countries, published in October 1998.3
2. Trade and investment in border regions in general and in the
German-Polish border regions in particular
State borders delimit the territory within which the political authorities of a country assert their claim
to lead and control society. This claim can differ in scale and intensity. Consequently, when analysing
the effects of state borders on border regions, the type of border must be taken into consideration.
Looking at the effects of borders, Ratti (1993, 247 and 1995, 353) for example draws a distinction
between borders as barriers, borders as filters and open borders. Martinez (1994, 2 ff.) does not
categorise the borders themselves but the adjacent regions. He distinguishes between alienated, co-
existent, interdependent, and integrated border regions. Of course, there are almost as many
categories as there are borders and border regions, as each shows some peculiarities. The extremes
are however relatively unambiguous: a totally closed political border prevents any exchange between
the neighbouring areas whereas an open border does not obstruct this at all.
The German-Polish border cannot be classed with either extreme. After having been closed for many
years (see Schultz 1996, 80-88), the border regime has been liberalised successively during the
1990s.  It is still not entirely open, however, and contains many barriers against the free movement of
goods and production factors. These barriers have been gradually lifted by means of bilateral and
multilateral treaties since about 1991. The German-Polish border will thus hereafter be referred to as
an opening border, to show that it has reached a certain degree of openness, but that the process of
opening is not yet complete. The liberalisation of cross-border trade was initiated with an agreement
to set up a Free Trade Zone between the EU and Poland in 1991.  This should lead to the complete
removal of import duties on manufacturing products by 2002.2 As early as 1988/89, the Polish
government allowed direct investment with a 100 percent capital share of the foreign investor and the
transfer of profits, and it further liberalised this in the years that followed. The possibilities for Polish
businesses to invest abroad were increased during negotiations on Poland’s accession to the OECD
in 1996. How does the liberalisation of the border regime influence trade and investment – and
through these economic growth – in the regions along the German-Polish border?
2.1. Trade and growth in border regions
2.1.1. Trade and growth in border regions – what regional economic theory tells us
The effects of a (closed) border on the sales of businesses from the border region were among the
first economic effects of borders dealt with in regional economic theory. Christaller (1968, 51),
Lösch (1962, 141 f.), and Giersch (1949/50, 89) use similar arguments to describe border regions
as disadvantaged areas. Based on the assumption of an optimal hexagonal sales area around the
location of an enterprise, they infer that a closed border prevents or hinders a company’s sales in the
cross-border part of this optimal sales area, and thereby reduces them. In other words, the border
reduces the total demand for goods produced in the border region. Businesses cannot compensate
for this by enlarging their sales area further inland, as higher transport costs and a lack of economies
of scale mean that they are at a disadvantage to their domestic competitors. If the economies of scale
of the domestic companies exceed the additional transport costs for supplying the markets of the
                                                                
2  The agreement does not contain a fixed timetable with regard to trade restrictions on agricultural products
and services. Negotiations on the removal of these restrictions are continuing in the Association Council, a
group made up of representatives from Poland and the EU which is working on the further liberalisation of
relations.4
border region, they might even displace businesses in the border region and enlarge their own sales
areas (Lösch 1962, 144).
One consequence of the abolition of physical and institutional barriers after the opening up of a
border is an increase in trade among the affected regions. Trade theory models list three
determinants of trade volume (Rauch 1991, Krugman and Venables 1990). The extent of a region’s
comparative advantages,  determined by its factor content and factor productivity, and the
economies of scale that had existed since the era of the closed border and which lower average
production costs both increase trade volume, whereas the third determinant, trade costs, lower it.
Moreover, in a free trade environment, trade theory predicts a specialisation of trade and production
according to comparative advantages which leads to welfare gains for all trading regions. The
distribution of these welfare gains depends on the balance of effects on  output, income, and
substitution effects resulting from the new trade relations.
Border regions are particularly affected by such trade enlargement. Producers in border regions
should have trade cost advantages over domestic producers trading with the neighbouring country.3
These lower trade costs include transport and information procurement, as border region businesses
know more about businesses, consumers and markets in the neighbouring country, and more people
speak the language spoken across the border.4 Moreover, proximity as well as existing trade
relations can lead to additional knowledge on overcoming the border barriers and reducing risks in
cross-border trade. This knowledge can be seen as a local benefit for managing cross-border flows
originating from the concentration of foreign trade related  economic activities, and further
strengthening this concentration. However, location theory also cites microeconomic arguments to
support a specific disadvantage of border regions in cross-border trade. If the businesses of a
border area are smaller than those further inland, e.g. due to the restricted sales area during the
period of a closed border, the border area is more affected by the difficulties which small and
medium-sized enterprises have to conquer when expanding foreign trade such as limited management
capacity and the difficulty in furnishing security (Habuda et al. 1998, 13-14).
Finding a negative correlation between distance and trade volume, empirical analyses prove that
opening borders change sales from border regions more than those from domestic regions; for
example in the case of the Canadian provinces and US-American states in McCallum (1995)5 or the
OECD-countries in Bröcker (1988) and Schumacher (1997).6 With regard to the East German
border regions, findings only exist for Saxony, where the growth of exports to Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary clearly exceeds the growth of total exports (Eli 1997, 14 f.). The significance
of these countries for Saxony’s exports is also higher than for Germany as a whole. Recent research
on the German-Polish border nevertheless shows the local cross-border activities of businesses to be
rather low (see Krätke 1998; Sander and Schmidt 1998, Barjak 1997).
Estimations and simulations of the growth effects of rising trade between developed European
regions and transformation or developing economies do not find lower growth in the developed
                                                                
3  Ratti (1995, 355-356) refers to these advantages as a position rent that producers in the border regions earn
due to their proximity to the neighbouring country. Like von Thünen’s position rent, this position rent
depends on the distance between the place of production and the market.
4  These effects of spatial proximity are manifested in a smaller ‘cognitive distance’ in microeconomic terms (see
Van Houtum 1997, 71-77) and as a smaller ‘cultural distance’ in terms of macroeconomics.
5  In addition, the Canadian-American border reduced trade to one twentieth, compared to trade among
Canadian provinces under similar conditions (McCallum 1995, 616).
6  The estimations also establish that lower communication costs – indicators are a common language and a
former colonial relationship – lead to more intensive trade relations (see Schumacher 1997, 336-337).5
economies (Bröcker and Jäger-Roschko 1996, Lücke 1997). There are no regional analyses for the
German border areas. For the US border regions, positive feed-back can be ascertained for
increasing economic inter-relations and growth in Mexico (Hanson 1996, 948, Patrick 1990
following Sander and Schmidt 1998, 450).
To sum up, trade and location theories merely justify the assumption that border regions are more
intensely connected to the neighbouring country by imports and exports than domestic regions.7
These theories also allow the conclusion that there are more links if comparative advantages and
economies of scale are high and trade costs low. It is uncertain from the theoretical premises which
region profits more from an increase in trade. Empirical studies however show positive effects for all
the regions adjacent to a border.
2.1.2 Sales, trade and growth in the regions at the German-Polish border
The supposed trade increase at the opening border between Germany and Poland can only be
partially explored, as trade data does not exist at regional level. The export rates of the regional
manufacturing sector can be used instead.8 In this respect, it is assumed that regions with high
manufacturing export rates also have a high flow of goods to Poland. This assumption is on the one
hand partially plausible, as gravitation models confirm a decrease in trade connections with increasing
distance. On the other hand, export rates only depend on a few firms at such a small spatial level.
Their trade relations might be largely independent of distance but dependent on special features, for
example in branch plants the trade relations of the mother company. The following interpretations can
therefore constitute no more than an initial, descriptive overview of the effects of an opening border
on local companies’ sales. Further research with better data will be necessary.
In 1996 and 1997, export rates in the majority of the border regions were lower than in East
Germany as a whole (see Table 1). The regions in the north (Vorpommern and Uckermark-Barnim)
export very little. In the Oderland-Spree region, the high export rate is attributable to one single
county: if the other counties were included the export rate would be much lower. Only in the
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien region are there some counties with above average export rates. This is
also the only region where both export rates and total sales increased in virtually all counties between
1991 and 1997. The export rate in Lausitz-Spreewald has also risen, but development is rather
heterogeneous within the region. Moreover, it has only been in the last few years that higher export
rates have not been caused by a reduction in total sales from this region (such as in the Spree-Neiße
county since 1995).
                                                                
7  This does not contradict the hypothesis that between the domestic and border regions of a single country
the networks are more dense than between the border regions of two adjacent countries, as put forth by
Rietveld (1993, 49-52).
8  There is no differentiated regional data on imports either.6
Table 1:









1991 1996 1997 1991 1996 1997 1995
Vorpommern . 2.6 1.3 1,769,597 2,300,638 2,371,855 0 .
Greifswald, city . . . 202,925 359,123 506,400 0 89
Ostvorpommern . 2.3 . 263,417 644,344 745,180 0 90
Uecker-Randow . 3.9 1.1 366,074 213,325 184,520 0 32
Stralsund, city . 0.2 . 521,428 546,263 396,619 0 66
Nordvorpommern . 6.2 1.4 265,855 294,317 270,957 0 62
Rügen . 3.4 . 149,898 243,266 268,179 0 103
Uckermark-Barnim 9.2 6.0 6.0 3,048,814 4,912,934 5,439,047 1 .
Barnim 7.9 10.8 10.7 780,697 843,848 881,413 1 7
Uckermark 9.7 5.0 5.1 2,268,117 4,069,086 4,557,634 1 16
Oderland-Spree 21.9 20.1 25.6 2,360,948 3,760,757 3,945,119 1 .
Frankfurt (Oder), city . . . 235,344 303,386 282,285 1 3
Märkisch-Oderland 4.9 1.2 . 389,109 753,647 825,920 0 19
Oder-Spree 25.8 25.4 25.6 1,736,495 2,703,724 2,836,914 1 11
Lausitz-Spreewald 4.4 5.4 8.4 8,386,930 6,805,399 7,520,406 1 .
Cottbus, city 0.8 5.3 6.9 1,621,690 683,459 772,392 1 3
Spree-Neiße 1.9 8.5 15.3 3,573,103 2,318,114 2,546,407 1 15
Oberspreewald-Lausitz 7.5 0.5 1.5 2,048,838 1,654,603 1,656,227 0 4
Dahme-Spreewald . 6.5 7.4 469,347 971,460 1,101,690 1 10
Elbe-Elster 16.6 5.2 5.6 673,952 1,177,763 1,443,690 0 32
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien 10.5 10.8 11.8 2,765,264 7,238,311 7,620,761 0 .
Görlitz, city . 3.0 5.6 . 452,216 541,214 0 44
Niederschl. Oberlausitzkreis 11.5 28.1 25.7 475,035 714,834 739,993 0 29
Löbau-Zittau 12.0 13.3 14.7 600,562 896,324 953,277 0 40
Bautzen 11.4 19.1 20.9 1,011,240 1,537,163 1,531,336 0 7
Hoyerswerda, city . 0.2 0.2 . 1,176,149 907,623 0 27
Kamenz 7.2 6.3 7.3 678,427 2,461,625 2,947,318 0 6
New Länder (excluding Berlin) 14.9 12.1 14.5 88,601,379 126,158,29
0
138,671,304 . .
a Export rate: Ratio of foreign sales to total sales in firms with 20 or more employees in the mining and
manufacturing sectors. Areas marked with a dot indicate that no data was published: these areas were therefore
not included in the calculation of regional export rates.
b BAB1 = 1: Majority of the county had motorway access to Poland in 1996/97 (IWH classification).
c BAB2: Travel time to the next motorway entrance in minutes (1995); mean values of 5 to 15 measuring points per
county, calculated by the University of Kassel.
Source: IWH calculations based on data from the statistical offices of the Länder; University of
Kassel.
According to new trade theory, economies of scale mean that the export volume of a region after
integration should depend on the market size before the opening up of the border. For this reason,
Table 1 shows the total sales in mining and manufacturing in 1991. A visual comparison between
those counties with high and those counties with low sales alone reveals that the export rates in
1996/97 do not show a positive correlation with market size.9 To understand this, one should bear in
mind that the trade regime between Germany (or rather the EU) and Poland was still being liberalised
in 1996 and 1997. The export rates for both years are then certainly not representative of integrated
economies. Secondly, sales in the East German mining and manufacturing sectors in 1991 were
                                                                
9  Some multiple correlation analyses were also undertaken but did not find any correlation either. The results
are not shown or discussed here owing to the small sample size.7
largely influenced by the bygone GDR central planning system and special conditions for trade with
eastern Europe. Thirdly, total export rates and sales can only be considered as rough indicators.
Industry-specific data which could take into consideration economies of scale in the production
process does not exist at regional level.
The significance of transport costs (representative of trade costs) was explored for regional exports
at the border with Poland using two indicators; one representing the time-distance from the counties
at the border to the Polish markets by road (BAB1), the other the accessibility of the counties within
the inter-regional road system in general (BAB2). Both indicators show no correlation with the
export rates (either in Table 1 or a multiple correlation analysis that will not be elaborated further in
this paper).10 On the one hand this can be attributed to a lack of correspondence between the
indicators. The export rate comprises manufacturing businesses’ exports to sales markets world-
wide, the accessibility indicators only measure integration within the national road system. On the
other hand, the long waits at the border crossings with the Central European neighbour countries
have lowered the relative importance of accessibility advantages.
“Old” and “new” trade theories predict a specialisation of the industry pattern of trade and
production in accordance with the comparative advantages of the trading regions. Consequently,
specialisation should have risen in the border regions in the period after the border was opened, and
the winners should be those industries with comparative advantages. Coefficients of specialisation
compare the industrial structure of sub-regions with that of the macro-region to which they belong
(for details of the calculation, see appendix). The closer the coefficient is to 1, the more specialised a
sub-region is. The coefficients of specialisation of the border regions have changed little between
1994 and 1997, except in the northernmost region of Vorpommern (see Table 2) where the
coefficient has not increased but decreased, along with the export rate (see Table 1). This could be
due on the one hand to declining industries that used to be major regional producers and exporters
(e.g. ship-building). On the other hand, it could be due to a growth of industries that (still) sell mainly
on the national markets. Both explanations can be put down to a process of structural change which
has altered the specialisation of Vorpommern from historical, partly centrally planned patterns to new
patterns determined by regional factor content and productivity.
Table 2:
Coefficients of specialisation in spatial planning areas along the border
a
1994
b 1995 1996 1997
Vorpommern 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.30
Uckermark-Barnim 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30
Oderland-Spree 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.27
Lausitz-Spreewald 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien – 0.21 0.21 0.20
a Calculated on the basis of industry data for employees eligible for social security payments; on details of the
calculation see appendix. No data available before 1994.
b No data for the Dresden district.
Source: IWH calculation based on data from the Federal Employment Office.
This process of structural change has been part of the economic transformation in all East German
regions since the opening up of the border in 1990. However, its extent differs among the regions
and depends on the degree of structural distortion of the regional economy. The more distorted the
                                                                
10  It should be noted that travel distances to the next motorway are very high in the north and in some counties
in the south. This indicates shortfalls with regard to access, the effects of which cannot however be
established by looking at export rates.8
regional economy is – that means the less its structures correspond to the ones generated in a market
economy – the smaller are the chances for exporting successfully. The degree of distortion of the
regional economy cannot be measured directly, as comparative advantages as well as factor content
and factor productivity of a region are virtually impossible to measure.11  A fairly simple measure for
the amount of structural change can be formulated by adding up the absolute deviation of an
industry’s shares at two points in time. On the basis of the data available this measure can be
calculated for the structural changes between 1994 and 1997.
•  Vorpommern attained the highest cumulative change (26.8). There was intensive structural
change, leading to a decrease in the degree of specialisation of this region. This obviously points
to distorted structures in 1994.  Ship-building activities were particularly dominant in the region.
The docks have locational advantages as they are located at the coastline and have a long
industrial tradition in Vorpommern, but competition is high due to over-capacity on the world
market.
•  Lower figures were recorded for Uckermark-Barnim (12.5) and Oderland-Spree (13.7). In
view of the fairly high and basically constant specialisation coefficients of these regions, two
competing conclusions can be drawn: either that in 1994 they already showed a pattern of
specialisation sustainable under market conditions, or that the intensity of structural change has
been lowered by public intervention in the market process. As the employment shares of the
most important regional industries have decreased (Uckermark-Barnim: oil industry, Oderland-
Spree: metal production), and export shares have only partially increased (see Table 1), the
second conclusion seems to be more plausible.
•  With an index of 17.3, the Lausitz-Spreewald region is in the middle with regard to the amount
of structural change. Changes occurred especially in chemical production and mechanical
engineering (lower employment shares) as well as textiles, plastics, and metalworking (higher
employment shares). More recently, these have been accompanied by rising exports.
•  The lowest figure is to be found in Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien (12.0), where it was however
only possible to compare 1997 with 1995. Integrating the relatively low coefficient of
specialisation and the average export rates into a regional profile, one can conclude that the
region has a diversified industry structure, increasing its exports without any significant
specialisation. Some sort of specialisation can be seen in the leather, textiles and clothing
industries which employ 10 percent of the labour force compared to only 3.9 percent in East
Germany as a whole. This regional focus on fairly labour intensive industries nevertheless seems
to be sustainable, though wages are much lower in neighbouring Poland and the Czech
Republic.12
The comparably low export rates in the border regions cannot be explained by a lack of economies
of scale or unfavourable access, and therefore high trade costs, on the basis of the available data.
The specialisation pattern that had developed historically has contributed greatly to the fact that some
regions have witnessed higher and others lower export gains. Particularly in Vorpommern, to a
smaller extent also in Uckermark-Barnim and Oderland-Spree, former industrial strongholds have
                                                                
11  For measurements such as the RCA-index (Revealed Comparative Advantage) that rely on a comparison of
import and export shares of an industry with import and export shares of the entire economy the required data
is again lacking at regional level.
12  The clothing industry increased its regional significance between 1994 and 1997 (from 1.8 % to 3.4 % of the
regional workforce)  but textiles and leather lost out in the same period (textiles: -1.3 %, leather: -0.3 %,
calculated with data from the Federal Employment Office).9
been torn down and not yet replaced by a new industrial system. In the Lausitz region (Saxony and
Brandenburg parts), the degree of specialisation was low. Some existing industrial sites could retain
or even increase their significance, whilst total manufacturing exports rose at the same time.
2.2 Investment and growth in border regions
2.2.1 Investment and growth in border regions according to regional economic theory
Location at a closed border has an effect on the private real capital stock of a region. There are
fewer businesses, and these have a lower volume of production than in domestic regions.  This is due
to limited sales areas (restricted in one direction by the border and in the other by transport costs,
see page 3), and lower labour market capacity.13 Border regions are less attractive investment
locations than other regions because of these locational disadvantages.
Regional theories repeatedly assume that following the opening up of a border, capital inflow into
border regions is the norm, and that the opening up of the border has a positive influence on regional
development by virtue of higher capital spending (Giersch 1949/50, Rauch 1991). However, the
microeconomic foundations for this supposition are contradictory, and there are arguments both for
higher and lower investment activity after the opening up of a border.
a)  Firstly, capital spending may rise due to an increase in sales of the regional businesses. As
mentioned, the opposite could also occur, that is a decrease in capital spending due to lower
production caused by rising imports (see page 4).
b)  Secondly, a reduction of border-related barriers improves the quality of the border regions as
investment locations and increases the preference to settle there. Locational disadvantages, such
as limited sales areas, fewer qualified workers, and wider infrastructure networks, are reduced.
But this only happens slowly after the opening up of a border. Moreover, the preferences for
certain locations and neglect of others established during the regime of the closed border may
persist and only suddenly change after some critical values are attained.14
c)  Thirdly, investment can be lower in a border region after the border has been opened up if
capital is exported. Due to the smaller spatial distances, transaction costs for foreign direct
investment in the neighbouring country may be lower for businesses in the border regions.15 As
lower costs enable small and medium-sized enterprises to invest abroad – which they might not
be able to do efficiently from a domestic location – higher capital exports to the exterior may
arise. The lower transaction costs can also theoretically cause lower outflows of capital from the
border areas than from other regions within a country, as other forms of co-operation are also
easier (such as simple supplier contracts, processing work under contract, or networks).
Therefore, one can only assume that firms on both sides of the border are more involved in
cross-border co-operation (see page 4).
The empirical results on capital spending in the East German border regions in Barjak (1997, 58) do
not confirm the hypothesis that these regions have become preferred territories for private investment
since the border has been opened up. Neither in the German regions at the Polish border, nor in
those at the Czech border did investment exceed the East German average between 1990 and 1995.
                                                                
13  Economic and socio-cultural factors lead to population losses in regions at closed borders.
14  As described by Krugman (1991, 26-29).
15  For example, costs for finding an investment object or location, for comparing the profitability of different
alternatives, or for co-ordinating and controlling the production facilities set up.10
There were naturally many barriers to the mobility of goods and production factors at both borders.
However, the manufacturing sector also spent relatively small amounts of capital in the area around
Berlin and along the former internal German border, where virtually no institutional barriers to
mobility remain.
When a border is opened, the sales volume of an enterprise, the evaluation of the border regions as
investment locations, and the possibility for cross-border capital-flows all change. There is no one
answer to the question whether this results in more or less capital spending in the border regions.
According to the law of diminishing returns, increased investment should - all things being equal -
cause higher growth effects in the border regions than in domestic regions.
2.2.2. Investment at the German-Polish border
The empirical analysis of investment had to be restricted to the mining and manufacturing sectors
owing to the lack of data on other branches of economic activity. The question can be examined as
to whether mining and manufacturing have experienced high - and in the course of the gradual
removal of the border, increasing - capital expenditure.
There is a broad variety of investment per capita in the counties and cities in the border area (see
Table 3). In some cases (Uckermark, Oder-Spree, Spree-Neiße and Oberspreewald-Lausitz
counties) more than twice the East German average was invested. These counties, as well as those
with high capital expenditure in Vorpommern and Oberlausitz, are locations of large-scale businesses
(so called “industrial core areas”) where extensive re-structuring measures have been undertaken.
These measures have been very capital-intensive, as the ratio of investment to employees reveals.
After their completion, investment is reduced in the industrial core areas, as the examples of
Ostvorpommern (shipbuilding) and Oberspreewald-Lausitz (chemicals, power plants) make clear.
Due to the great variance of data on capital spending, the counties with industrial core areas can
hardly be considered representative for the border regions. Of the 14 counties and urban
municipalities with capital spending below the East German average, 11 do not reach 75 percent and
8 not even 50 percent of the East German figure. Investment was particularly low in the sparsely
industrialised north (Vorpommern) and in the urban municipalities. The regions at the Polish border
have not yet become a preferred location for investment in East Germany. As argued before, this
could be due to a worsening economical situation and capacity utilisation as a consequence of rising
imports, capital-outflows into the neighbouring country, or a persistence of locational disadvantages.
The sales figures from Table 1 (see page 6) can also be used to indicate the capacity utilisation and
income situation. They make it clear that the development of sales was generally positive in the
border regions from 1991 to 1997, except for some counties in Vorpommern and Lausitz-
Spreewald. The counties with little or no sales growth are also those with low investment per
employee and per capita.16 It is then probable that investment and sales are interdependent in the
border regions. The results do not however indicate any reasons for the slump in sales and low
profitability in some counties, e.g. whether these are caused by imports from Poland, or by economic
transformation accompanied by far-reaching structural changes alone.
With regard to cross-border capital-flows, interview partners in all regions at the German-Polish
border stated that out-migration of entire businesses has rarely happened. In some cases, labour-
intensive activities have been moved to Poland.
                                                                
16  This result is confirmed with great stability in cross-section regressions, whereby the development of sales
from 1991 to 1997 as well as the volume of sales for 1991 on the average investment in the period 1992 to 1997
were estimated (both per capita and per employee) for 20 counties along the border.11
Table 3:
Investment in mining and manufacturing in the regions at the border to Poland
ad
Investment in mining and manufacturing
in DM per capita
Investment
in DM per employee




Vorpommern 470 647 768 1,029 232
c 160
c 551 21,803
Greifswald, city 252 424 279 134 93 154 223 6,888
Ostvorpommern 513 1,508 2,113 2,559 461 150 1,217 53,627
Uecker-Randow 406 272 197 157 169 229 238 10,803
Stralsund, city 529 434 1,397 2,541 . . 1,225 22,943
Nordvorpommern 805 649 168 268 131 105 354 18,955
Rügen 124 196 209 352 222 185 215 16,095
Uckermark-Barnim 828 2,042 1,901 1,496 1,206 1,709 1,530 43,987
Barnim 624 471 526 487 249 300 443 12,458
Uckermark 1,011 3,461 3,160 2,440 2,120 3,104 2,550 71,358
Oderland-Spree 548 1,045 1,139 1,077 1,837 1,732 1,230 41,953
Frankfurt(Oder), city 459 676 1,269 448 90 64 501 20,620
Märkisch-Oderland 332 1.071 1,204 835 450 327 703 42,110
Oder-Spree 785 1,187 1,023 1,567 3,826 3,691 2,013 47,080
Lausitz-Spreewald 1,478 1,592 1,331 1,356 1,151 1,044 1,326 21,522
Cottbus, city 990 250 267 526 316 244 432 11,190
Spree-Neiße 1,589 2,598 2,290 2,775 2,636 2,517 2,401 24,866
Oberspreewald-Lausitz 2,501 3,043 2,578 1,622 1,294 1,260 2,050 25,089
Dahme-Spreewald 882 742 426 541 445 397 572 20,092
Elbe-Elster 1,232 933 748 1,077 824 536 892 21,742
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien . . 731 852 980 856 855 18,492
Görlitz, city . . 534 731 1,683 655 901 16,448
Niederschl. Oberlausitzkreis . . 509 293 834 608 561 15,850
Löbau-Zittau . . 407 425 444 729 501 14,016
Bautzen . . 863 496 951 825 784 16,234
Hoyerswerda, city . . 533 2,187 897 2,139 1,439 21,043
Kamenz . . 1,254 1,593 1,398 821 1,266 26,536
New Länder as a whole
(excluding Berlin) 959 1,069 1,002 q1,00
3
1,072 1,026 1,022 23,477
a The average yearly population figures for the counties constituted the base for the calculations. If not
published by the statistical offices, a mean value was calculated by the IWH.
b Average for Stralsund 1992-1995, Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien: 1994-1997
c
 Without Stralsund.
d Only firms with 20 and more employees, as included in the statistical offices’ registration schemes.
Source: Statistical offices of the new German Länder, IWH calculations.
Comparing investment on the German and Polish sides of the border makes it possible to establish
whether the opening up of the border and the integration process so far has had differing effects, for
example with respect to locational quality. In the course of time, investment per capita, standardised
with the national value to take inflation rates into account, has gone up in three German regions and
down in the other two (see Figure 1). In view of the fact that in Oderland-Spree and Uckermark-
Barnim part of the investment took place in large-scale industrial core plants, in only one region,
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien, has investment increased as the border barriers were reduced. Of
course, investment in East Germany is not only determined by locational characteristics and the
regional position in terms of locational competition (for investment), but also by the extensive
economic support from federal and Land agents (see section 3.2). As the border regions have also12
benefited from this economic promotion, the decrease in the standardised capital spending ratio
(compared to East  Germany as a whole) points to a change for the worse in terms of the
competitive position with respect to locational competition. By contrast, on the Polish side three out
of four regions have increased their share of total national investment in the manufacturing sector (see
Figure 2). They have consequently benefited more from the opening of the border and improved
their position in inter-regional competition for investment.
Figure 1:
Per capita investment in manufacturing in the German spatial planning regions at the border
- in percent of the East German value -
Source: Statistical offices of the new German Länder, IWH calculations.
Figure 2:
Per capita investment in manufacturing in the Polish voivodships along the border 
a
- in percent of the national value for Poland -
a Voivodships of Jelenia Gora and Legnica added to “Neisse”.
Source: Polish statistical office (GUS), IWH calculations.
This result hints at the significance of locational disadvantages in the German regions at the Polish
border. Because of a lack of statistical data it is difficult to gain a direct and unbiased measurement
of locational quality. Filling the data gap with a firm survey is costly and time-consuming. Instead,
interviews were conducted with decision-makers and administrative personnel in the regions and
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grey literature explored in order to assess the current state of knowledge on locational quality. The
main results for the most important location factors are outlined below:17
Distance from (potential) markets: With respect to this factor, the regions bordering on Berlin and
to Poland, i.e. Uckermark-Barnim, Oderland-Spree and Lausitz-Spreewald, show differences at
micro-level. The interviewees pointed to a East-West gap, with a relatively good economic situation
in the communities close to Berlin (for example with respect to business location choices). This effect
of the German capital is most marked in the areas with major road connections. Commuter
networks, especially to work in Berlin or in the opposite direction to visit recreation and tourism
facilities in East Brandenburg, have a broader spatial reach. The differences are less marked in
Vorpommern where the coastal area constitutes a major point of attraction for tourism, and in the
Oberlausitz region where the A4 motorway from Dresden to Goerlitz functions as a development
axis. Some businesses from more remote regions have moved closer to this axis.
According to our interview partners, proximity to Poland has barely any positive effects on
investment activity, as sales and supplies have only expanded to Polish markets to a small extent and
there are no cross-border spillover effects.18 Only in parts of the southernmost region of
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien have more intensive cross-border economic ties developed.19 Various
reasons were cited as responsible for the low interest of non-resident investors in the border regions,
for instance the peripheral location within Germany, the low competitiveness of many location factors
compared to Poland, and the negative regional image.
Labour force supply: One problem cited was the out-migration of qualified workers in virtually all
border regions where large-scale production sites were closed down or radically downsized after
German unification. Qualified labour has been lost in this way throughout East Germany. Labour
market potential could be saved in investment that linked up with the existing industry structure, such
as steel in Oder-Spree county, tourism in Vorpommern and textiles and clothing in Ober- and
Niederlausitz. The aforementioned commuters to Berlin may lower pressure on the local labour
market, but they only exist to a partial extent as a hidden reserve for the settlement of new businesses
in the border regions.20 Additionally, job changes, long-term unemployment and a lack of
opportunities for “learning-by-doing” have reduced the stock of qualified labour. Successful re-
qualification and re-training measures were given particular mention in the service sector (e.g. for call
centres, teleworking, logistics and marketing). Compensating for lacking qualifications by employing
workers from the other side of the border is only marginally important in this respect, for instance
with German managers in Poland, or Polish restoration workers and carpenters in Germany.
Road infrastructure: Table 1 (see page 6) shows fairly insufficient road network access to the
northern and parts of the southern border regions. This was confirmed in the regional interviews,
                                                                
17  They have proved to be important in various analyses on location evaluation conducted among East German
firms, see e.g. Brenke (1996, 240) and Grabow, Henckel, Hollbach-Grömig (1995, 328).
18  This opinion is not unrivalled, and it might also be changing. When establishing special economic zones, the
Polish government also set up a zone in Kostrzyn/Slubice very close to the border. Local agents and
personnel assigned to the economic promotion of the neighbouring German border region consider co-
operation with this zone as a possible nucleus for intensifying cross-border economic relationships (see
section 3.3).
19  In the Löbau-Zittau county, intensive relationships to Polish and Czech businesses, located to the south of
this county, were mentioned. The interviewees estimated that 60 percent of the local firms and virtually all big
firms have economic ties across the borders.
20  Cross-border commuting to and from Poland is still the exception rather than the rule.14
which also uncovered dissatisfaction with the road infrastructure in most of the regions.21 In the north
and the south of the border area the road connections in all directions were deemed insufficient. In
the Berlin catchment area, the bad condition and overloading of East-West connections, including the
border-crossings, constitute bottle-necks. Not only the situation on the German side of the border
but also the lack of integration of the main connections into the Polish road network are frequent
problems. The interviewees complain that the removal of these bottlenecks is regarded as a low
priority in Poland. Within the regions, the low standard of cross-town links, by-passes and
motorway feeder roads reduce possible travel speeds.
To sum up, less private capital has been invested in the German regions at the Polish border than in
the East German average in the manufacturing sector. This has been partially caused by reduced
sales in the manufacturing businesses. It has been furthered by an accumulation of locational
disadvantages in some regions (e.g. Vorpommern). The positive effects of Berlin (sales potential)
certainly outweigh the negative effects (worker drain, road overloading), but their spatial reach is
limited. Investment has increased especially where there is a broad supply of qualified labour
(Oberlausitz). There is hardly any indication of capital exports.
3. Regional policy for border regions
3.1. Justification for and strategies of regional policy to benefit border regions
In line with the neo-classical approach, in a market economy the market forces must ensure an
optimal allocation of resources in space. Regional policy therefore requires a justification
(Maier/Tödtling 1996, 170 ff.; Fürst et al., 1976 5ff.). A distinction is usually drawn between
economic and compensatory reasons for regional policy measures.
What particular justification could there be for regional policy measures to benefit border regions?
State borders do not just represent awkward and inconvenient barriers. They protect societies and
economies from undesirable externalities. The negative effects of a border stand in the way of the
positive function.  These negative effects do not however concern all regions of a state to the same
extent.  The barrier function of the border is particularly apparent within those regions located
directly at the border (see section 2.1.1.). With closed borders, regional policy could then be seen
as compensation for the disadvantages for the border regions of a division which is otherwise useful
and necessary for society as a whole. When national borders are opened up, so the barriers to the
movement of persons, goods, services and capital are lifted and the disadvantages of the border
location become less significant. The border may even gain a locational advantage (see page 4). In
the case of  opening borders, the argument that regional policy compensates for disadvantages
therefore loses ground.  Regional policy to benefit the border regions can in this case only be justified
for equalising wealth differences. It can however take a very long time to remove the divisive effect
of a border. The typical locational weaknesses of the border regions, that is a less well developed
transport infrastructure than that inland, lower business density, a lack of innovation with regard to
existing businesses and so on cannot be eliminated overnight. The persisting disadvantages of the
division may then justify the compensatory payments to the border region for some time after the
border has been opened up.
                                                                
21  Only in Lausitz-Spreewald and Barnim county was the road system judged to be fairly dense. Further
improvement could concentrate on quality.15
Justifying the financial assistance provided to border regions as compensation for disadvantages
occasioned by the border does not however say anything about regional strategy. Various regional
strategies will be discussed below in terms of their suitability for assisting border regions.  The
regional policy applied at the Polish-German border will then be considered and assessed in the light
of these strategies.
Market-oriented regional policy is a framework regional policy. It ensures the elimination of any
factors that might hinder a spatial allocation of production factors optimal for growth.  This strategy is
aligned to growth policy. It does not contain any particular preference for the border regions. A
market-oriented regional strategy particularly eliminates obstacles to mobility, which hinder the
migration of the factors capital and labour to the areas with the largest relative scarcity and the
highest wages. The removal of barriers to mobility especially concerns infrastructural development
and the securing of competition as well as market flexibility and information procurement on regional
factor allocation and factor payments. This market-oriented regional policy strategy does not include
any more extensive measures.
Equalisation-oriented regional policy for peripheral regions deals mainly with the specific
features of economically weak regions (e.g. high unemployment, low business density, a lack of
capital goods). This policy is geared towards realising an equal standard of living in the sub-regions
of a country. It is often argued that this policy opens up non-exploited regional production potential
and therefore contributes to total economic growth.  However, in view of the lack of information on
state regional policy, conflict between the aim of providing compensation and that of encouraging
growth cannot be ruled out. In addition to market-oriented regional policy instruments, business
subsidies are introduced to raise economic activity in the border regions above the profitability
threshold. As well as business subsidies being granted, infrastructure provision in the problem regions
is also often improved. Infrastructure measures are designed to create prior input to attract foreign
investors as well as to strengthen the competitiveness of existing businesses.
Border-specific regional policy is a promotion strategy oriented to causes, which aims to remove
the barrier effects of the border and strengthen the border itself as a contact area. It features both
growth and compensatory elements. The removal of obstacles to mobility with regard to the cross-
border movement of goods, services, capital and persons aims at promoting growth. This especially
concerns the removal of physical barriers to mobility such as bottlenecks at the border crossing
points, but also a change in institutional regulations which hinder cross-border mobility (such as the
mutual recognition of professional qualifications by neighbouring states). These measures should in
principle benefit all regions of a national economy to the same extent. Special assistance is therefore
granted to businesses, employees and municipalities in the border regions as a form of compensation
in addition to the above-mentioned mobility enhancing measures. These measures deal directly with
obstacles to cross-border economic co-operation and help eliminate them. Such measures may, for
example, comprise specific information and consultancy provision for small and medium-sized
businesses with regard to investment conditions, economic and customs conditions or the
organisation of events where business representatives can meet and establish opportunities for co-
operation. As the intensity of cross-border economic relations also depends on socio-cultural
conditions, the influence on these intangible locational factors is also one element of a border-specific
regional policy (e.g. bilingual schools, joint cultural events or the promotion of tourism in the area
around the border).
Support through social transfers: Finally, the provision of transfers for consumption purposes to
the inhabitants of the border regions is also - in theory - feasible as a regional strategy, for example in16
the form of unemployment benefit. This strategy would be compensatory and serve to ensure a
specific per capita income in the disadvantaged border regions in accordance with distributive norms.
Each of the above-mentioned strategies have both advantages and disadvantages and it is thus
extremely difficult to rank them definitively (see overview).
Overview:




• No distortion of the spatial factor
allocation
• Partial removal of border-related
locational disadvantages
• Results are unpredictable, e.g. passive




• Short-term effect • Removal of border-related locational
disadvantages is at best indirect
• Numerous distortions of the spatial
factor allocation (windfall profit,




• Direct removal of border-specific
disadvantages
• Little distortion of the spatial factor
allocation
• Long-term effect
• Weak effect of assistance
Support through
social transfers
• No distortion of the spatial factor
allocation
• Short-term effect
• No removal of border-specific locational
disadvantages
Source: own research.
The market-oriented regional policy is preferable from the point of view of allocation effects. It does
not lead to allocational distortion and is therefore optimal for growth. As the effects of this strategy
are however unpredictable for the border regions and a “passive regeneration” of the border regions
cannot be ruled out – a regeneration that relies on the out-migration of people to lower social and
economic problems – a combination with one or several of the above-mentioned strategies seems
most sensible. As they cause little or no allocative distortion, the border-specific strategy and support
through social transfers could be used. The latter is effective in the short-term in terms of securing a
specific level of income. However, it does not remove border-specific shortfalls in development. The
border-specific strategy is in line with causes. However, it can only bring about long-term effects. To
the extent to which a removal of border-related disadvantages is speeded up by the border-specific
strategy, self-financing effects can also be anticipated.  This may mean a quicker abolition of the
regional assistance justified by the divisive effect of the border. A global compensatory strategy is
less suitable for eliminating border-specific shortfalls.  It only serves to alleviate the symptoms of a
border location and is linked with numerous allocational distortions.
A brief overview of strategies to aid the border regions applied in practice by the EU, the German
federal government and the Länder as well as the measures implemented to do so can be found
below. This will be followed by an assessment of a “bottom up” regional policy approach as
developed in the border regions.
3.2. Regional strategies and instruments at federal and EU level for the German-Polish
border region - current situation and assessment17
3.2.1. Enhancing the sales of enterprises located at the German-Polish border
All of the programmes to support foreign trade generally offered to East or West German companies
are available to businesses located in the regions along the Polish border.  According to a data base
of the Federal Ministry for Economics and Technology, the federal government alone offers 12
programmes for export assistance. These programmes support participation at trade fairs, provide
financial support for export trade and foreign direct investment and cover foreign trade risks through
guarantees. Federal government assistance is supplemented by various Länder funding programmes.
Hence, in the Free State of Saxony there is a programme to refinance export credits as well as a
programme to improve business performance. Brandenburg offers a programme to support trade
fairs.  It also offers a loan guarantee specifically for direct investment in Poland. In Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, a subsidy is available to employ a foreign trade assistant and there is also a directive
on sales and export assistance. These programmes are above all aimed at overcoming shortfalls
associated with company size. The measures are thus not limited to businesses in the border regions.
The provision of various types of sales-oriented financial assistance is supplemented by information
and advice on foreign trade. In the framework of assistance to foreign trade, border region
enterprises (as well as enterprises in other regions) have access to a wide range of organisations
providing information and advice. A Federal Office of Foreign Trade Information data base mentions
95 such institutions for the three East German Länder bordering on Poland. These deal with foreign
trade relations in general, with the Central and East European countries or specifically with Poland.22
In Frankfurt (Oder) alone (ca. 78,000 inhabitants) six institutes offer advisory services for sales and
foreign trade.23
To sum up, market assistance does not just benefit the border regions but all of the regions of East
Germany, as weak points in terms of acquiring foreign trade partners are brought about less by
geographic location than business size. It is part of an equalisation-oriented regional policy which
aims to support small and medium-sized businesses. In the border regions it also however assumes
the form of border-specific assistance, as in these areas a lack of information about market
possibilities and conditions (in the neighbouring country) can lie at the root of market problems if one
assumes that businesses in domestic regions as well as in border regions are better informed about
their own country than they are about the neighbouring country.24
3.2.2. Promotion of investment in the German-Polish border regions
The  financial promotion of private capital goods investment compensates for locational
disadvantages, thereby reducing the cost of an investment project and improves its profitability.
Capital goods investment in the East German regions along the Polish border is on the one hand
supported by the instruments available throughout East Germany: an investment subsidy of 20% of
the investment costs eligible for assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises and of 10% for
other investments. This investment subsidy is granted automatically (see Heimpold 1998). Up to the
                                                                
22 Of these, 60 function on a national level (e.g. the Federal Office of Foreign Trade Information, Hermes, the
German-Polish Chamber of Industry and Commerce and inter-trade organisations), 10 in the Länder (e.g.
economic promotion organisations) and 22 at regional level (e.g. Chambers of Trade and Commerce,
Chambers of Handicrafts).
23 These comprise the office of the Euroregion PRO EUROPA VIADRINA, the Chamber of Industry and
Commerce, the Chamber of Handicrafts, the Business and Innovation Centre Frankfurt (Oder), the East
Brandenburg Investor Centre and the World Trade Centre in Frankfurt (Oder).
24  That does not contradict the aforementioned assumption that businesses in border regions are better
informed about the neighbouring country than their counterparts in domestic regions.18
end of 1998, investment in businesses and housing was also funded by a system of accelerated
depreciation. Moreover, small and medium-sized enterprises in East Germany, including the border
regions, can benefit from low-interest loans to finance business establishment or for growth
investment. Finally, there is a regional economic assistance instrument in the form of a joint
programme on “Improvement of the regional economic structure" (German abbreviation: GRW).
Along with the EU border-funding programme Interreg and several low-budget funding programmes
at Land level, this is one of the few funding programmes to permit a spatial differentiation of funding
to the benefit of the border regions. The programme is examined more closely below with regard to
its effectiveness in the regions along the German-Polish border.
The programme on “Improvement of the regional economic structure” funds capital investment in the
industrial economy as well as business-related infrastructure measures. Industrial investment is only
funded if it is aimed at improving sales potential outside the region (in accordance with the export
basis theory), as particularly large development impulses are thereby  expected for the regional
economy. The programme is co-financed to a large extent by the European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF). The funding is discretionary. On account of high problem levels in East Germany as a
whole, all of its regions are eligible for funding under ERDF programmes as well as that on
“Improvement of the regional economic structure”. However, within East Germany the rates of
funding awarded for industrial development are spatially differentiated. This differentiation occurs via
an indicator-based ranking of the East German labour market regions. For the period 1997 to 1999,
this ranking placed all labour market regions along the German-Polish border into the highest funding
priority group. In these regions, industrial investment can be funded to a maximum of 35% of the
investment costs (in small and medium-sized enterprises up to 50%). In the remaining regions, the
maximum funding amount is around 7% lower, that is 28% and 43% respectively. To a certain
extent, those Länder bordering on Poland further strengthen these preferences towards the border
regions. In the period 2000 to 2003, the East German regions along the Polish border will continue
to be supported with the highest possible level of funding in the framework of the GRW-programme
(BBR 1999, 4 f.). Yet this also implies that the situation in the regions along the German-Polish
border has not seen any significant improvement when measured by the indicators on which funding
eligibility is based (under-employment, level of income and infrastructure provision).
With regard to the spatial distribution of the funding for this programme, in the period 1990-1998
there was a total inflow of DM 7.6 bn of subsidies for business investment into the border regions. In
terms of assistance awarded for industrial investment projects in relation to the population, the
border regions were thereby slightly behind the East German average (ca. 6%), receiving 2,782
DM/inhabitant as opposed to 2,974 DM (see Table 4). The spatial planning regions bordering on
Poland are certainly not the worst off areas of East Germany with relation to the flow of funding. Of
the 22 spatial planning regions in East Germany, those regions on the German-Polish border can be
ranked as follows in terms of the level of funding granted for businesses (in relation to population): 1
(Uckermark-Barnim), 10 (Lausitz-Spreewald), 14 (Oderland-Spree), and 15 (Vorpommern). Only
the spatial planning region Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien is ranked  21
st (last but one). The “top
ranking” of the spatial planning region Uckermark-Barnim should not hide the fact that a few major
projects (mineral oil processing, paper processing) influenced the high level of funding in this region
(Eickelpasch/ Pfeiffer 1998, 40, see also the data on manufacturing investment in Table 3).
Table 4:
Funding of business investment in the framework of the joint project “Improvement of the regional
economic structure” along the German-Polish border19
Spatial planning region Investment in
DM per inhabitant




Vorpommern 11,137 34 2,610
Uckermark-Barnim 20,217 22 4,706
Oderland-Spree 11,028 24 2,645
Lausitz-Spreewald 12,540 26 2,807
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien 8,963 26 2,135
Spatial planning regions along the
border as a whole 11,952 27 2,782
New Länder
(excluding Berlin) as a whole 13,547 28 2,974
Source: IWH calculations, based on figures from the Federal Office for the Economy and the
Federal Statistical Office.
An assessment of the funded investment by type of investment (unfortunately figures were only
available for the period 1990-1994) reveals that in the spatial planning regions along the border,
projects to set up new businesses account for 44% of the total funded investment projects. Such
projects made up 52% of the East German average. Correspondingly, enterprise investment projects
in existing businesses play a more important role, with a share of 56% as opposed to 48% of the
East German average. Therefore, the spatial planning regions along the border were less successful in
securing new investors compared to the East German average. Investment in medium-sized
enterprises in the border regions funded by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau in the framework
of ERP-loan programmes is also below average (see Table 5).25
Table 5:
Loans granted by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau in the framework of ERP-programmes in the
period 1990-1997 in the East German spatial planning regions along the German-Polish border
Spatial planning regions Cases Total loan
Number Number of cases
per 10,000
inhabitants
DM (mn.) DM per
inhabitant
Vorpommern 1,849 35 541 1,010
Uckermark-Barnim 970 31 235 748
Oderland-Spree 1,240 28 349 784
Lausitz-Spreewald 3,004 42 693 965
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien 3,462 47 748 1,025
Spatial planning regions along the
border as a whole 10,525 38 2,566 936
New Länder as a whole
(excluding Berlin) 63,976 45 16,575 1,163
Source: IWH calculations based on figures from the  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau  and the
Federal Statistical Office.
In the framework of the funding of business-related infrastructure, subsidies totalling around 4.9
bn. DM or 1,797 DM per inhabitant were awarded (Table 6). This means that the infrastructure
funding per inhabitant lies above the East German average of 1,633 DM. Investments to an amount
of 7.2 mn. DM were jointly financed by the funding. These above average infrastructural measures
do not however concern all spatial planning regions but only Vorpommern and Oberlausitz-
                                                                
25 The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau is a federal bank aimed at economic promotion via loan and guarantee
programmes and other measures.20
Niederschlesien. These regions have the lowest per capita funding for industrial investment. The
grants are awarded in the border regions above all for the acquisition of industrial premises (29%),
tourism facilities (24%), sewage and waste removal (15%), transport connections (15%) and training
institutions (6%). The share of tourism projects lies above the East German average in all border
regions except Uckermark-Barnim.
Table 6:
Funding of business-related infrastructure investment in the framework of the joint project
“Improvement of the regional economic structure” in the period 1990-1998 in the East German
spatial planning regions along the German-Polish border
Spatial planning region Investment in
DM per inhabitant




Vorpommern 3,519 11 2,435
Uckermark-Barnim 1,660 2 1,251
Oderland-Spree 2,412 2 1,641
Lausitz-Spreewald 2,066 3 1,522
Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien 3,038 10 1,932
Spatial planning regions along the border
as a whole 2,617 6 1,797
New Länder as a whole (excluding Berlin) 2,532 5 1,633
Source: IWH calculations on the basis of figures from the Federal Office for the Economy and the
Federal Statistical Office.
To sum up, the funding of industrial investment in the framework of the programme on “Improvement
of the regional economic structure” is one element of a compensatory strategy. The granting of
business subsidies has undoubtedly helped to compensate the locational disadvantages of the border
regions. Supplementary infrastructure measures have attempted to create prior input to attract foreign
investors (and create better conditions for local businesses). It is unlikely that investments of this
amount would have been made without the funding.  Nevertheless, the spatial allocation of the
funded investments and especially the less important role played by start-up investment shows that
regional political subsidies only have a limited spatial influence in favour of the border regions.
Although there are no empirical findings for the border regions, allocative distortions, for example in
the form of windfall profits or substitution effects through capital investment funding cannot be ruled
out (see Schalk/Untiedt 1999). As the programme is a typical instrument for a global compensatory
regional policy, one cannot expect that it will directly remove border-specific shortfalls (e.g. barriers
to cross-border business co-operation). To overcome these shortfalls, the GRW can at best make
an indirect contribution by improving the competitiveness of the businesses funded in terms of quality
and price through modernising the capital stock. Whether and to what extent small-scale cross-
border economic links will emerge does not however just rely on modern regional capital stock, but
on many other circumstances. The interviews conducted with experts indicate a series of obstacles to
co-operation, above all in the socio-cultural field. The German-Polish border continues to represent
a major language barrier. There remain mental reservations and also fears on the part of the
population with regard to cross-border economic relations.
The EU joint initiative Interreg offers particular support in this area. Interreg funding can be assigned
to a border-specific regional policy. Almost 900 million marks are available for the East German
border regions to Poland and the Czech Republic for the period 1994 to 1999. According to expert
estimates, the number of projects to promote cross-border economic co-operation is currently still
very low. Proposals for new institutions, information centres and meeting centres are the main21
projects. Cross-border culture projects are in part easier to arrange than economic ones. One
hindrance is that - unlike with borders within the EU - the  Interreg funding stops at the  external
borders of the EU.26
To sum up, Interreg funding can be classed as a border-specific regional policy. Even if cultural and
other projects which have a positive influence on the intangible locational factors are thus able to
improve locational conditions and heighten growth in the border regions, it is clear that at present
Interreg is not optimally arranged. Business disadvantages caused by the border must be targeted
and eliminated more effectively.
3.3. Own-initiatives in the regions: “Network for attracting businesses and providing
investor services in East Brandenburg”
As central funding provision tends to cause unitary problem-solving strategies, assistance policy for
the benefit of the border regions at EU, federal and Länder level needs to be supplemented with a
decentralised regional policy which is directly linked to concrete regional strengths and weaknesses
in the area and can generate  regional development strategies. An example illustrating the
decentralised regional policy in East Brandenburg follows below:
The project concerns a concept for a “Network for attracting businesses and providing investor
services in East Brandenburg” (Ministry of Economics 1998). The concept is a border-specific
regional initiative. It is based however partly on traditional equalisation-oriented  regional policy
instruments (business subsidies and the promotion of business-related infrastructure). The concept
was developed by the Ministry of Economics and the economic assistance organisation in
Brandenburg. The development of such a concept came about as a result of various problems. These
included the lack of co-ordination between the approximately 50 economic assistance institutions at
regional or local level, cited as a problem in the past by experts in the region. Identification with the
region East Brandenburg was considered to be low. The situation in the border regions was, to the
regret of observers, often seen in a negative light. The border location was not marketed in a
targeted and co-ordinated manner. Cross-border co-operation was considered unsatisfactory.
During the search for alternative regional strategies, the concept for a network for attracting
businesses and providing investor services was eventually developed. At the core of the project is
the idea that, in accordance with investment locations and special economic zones in Poland, on the
German side of the border well developed industrial sites  will be marketed together with the
generous possibilities for funded investment. The intention is to conduct international locational
marketing together with the Polish side. To convince investors of the advantages of having two
locations, one on either side of the Oder, model calculations on having a “dual location” in
Brandenburg and Poland were made. Model calculations for the metalworking, micro-
electronics/electrical appliances sectors and for call centres all show that a dual location is more
favourable than if investment is only made on one side of the border. However, depending on the
scale of investment and the cost structure the benefits will be felt most on one or the other side of the
border. With a major and capital intensive project, the generous investment funding in Brandenburg
is more attractive. In the case of smaller labour-cost intensive projects the Polish side is more
                                                                
26 A special section of the Phare programme exists in Poland to deal with cross-border co-operation. However,
the project-related co-operation between these political fields does not function very well at present. (see
Roch et al. 1998, 48). Discussions with decision-makers at Land level and the evaluation reports on Interreg
funding have revealed differences in the administrative structures on both sides of the border and the fact
that the Interreg and Phare programmes belong to different political fields of the European Union to be
obstacles to a better co-ordination between the Interreg and Phare programmes.22
favourable. The model calculations are an instrument which should help investors optimise their
projects by choosing a dual location. In addition, it is planned to market the locational advantages of
the Euroregions Pomerania, Viadrina and Spree-Neiße-Bober and to enhance the image of the
region (Investor Centre East Brandenburg 1999; Ministry for Economics 1999, 1). It is of course
impossible to comment on the effectiveness of this dual-location marketing in view of the short period
for which this initiative has been in operation. Moreover, it has been asked how the free movement
of persons between both sides of the border can be achieved in the framework of the “dual-location”
concept (Schröder 1999). Having corresponding industrial locations requires a trouble-free cross-
border movement of goods and persons. Therefore, measures to develop infrastructure also belong
to the project to attract businesses and provide investor service in East Brandenburg.
To sum up, the “Network for attracting businesses and  providing  investor services in East
Brandenburg” represents the first attempt to convert the general equalisation-oriented strategy for
regional policy into a border-specific regional policy. The border location is deliberately used to
assert a locational advantage and the attempt made to quantify locational advantages. The location is
marketed in conjunction with Polish partners. The concept seeks to integrate various fields
(information, advice, infrastructure measures, support for existing businesses), which are important
for attracting businesses and providing investor services into a global concept. One criticism is that
the concept depends largely on the granting of business subsidies. If such subsidies were to be cut as
a result of public coffers being low or to avoid allocative distortion then the viability of this concept
would be called into question.
4. Conclusion
Theoretical premises do not allow any clear conclusion to be drawn as to whether the opening up of
borders has a positive or negative effect on the border regions.  The present empirical analysis of the
German regions on the Polish border shows that economic development is unfavourable in the
majority of these regions compared to the East German average.  However, the causes for this are
not to be attributed to the border location but rather to the fact that the border regions are part of the
East German transformation economy. Along the border there are thus regions such as Vorpommern
or Uckermark-Barnim which belong to the weakest regional economies in the new Länder but also
better-performing regions such as Oberlausitz in the south. Processes triggered by the transformation
of the GDR central command economy into a market economy, such as sectoral structural change or
the abolition of non-productive labour, and shortfalls such as insufficient infrastructure are particularly
prominent in the economically weak regions at the German-Polish border.
Regional policy can respond to the problems of a region located at a border with specific
compensation for disadvantages. To arrange this efficiently, it is important to draw a clear distinction
between various possible regional strategies and, moreover, to make use of  their respective
advantages. The instruments introduced in the border regions are to a large extent part of a global
equalisation-oriented regional policy which applies generally to regions lagging behind in terms of
development. Border-specific obstacles can at best be indirectly removed with such an equalisation-
oriented regional policy. On account of the limited effect of subsidies granted in the framework of
regional policy, in the border regions border-specific political measures are being developed and
implemented instead. These include the targeted marketing of the border area as a location for
business settlement as well as various information and advisory bodies for small and medium-sized
enterprises to remove barriers to entry in the Polish market. Interreg also deals with border-specific23
shortfalls and the improvement of intangible locational factors. In the further course of the study,
suggestions will be made as to how the border-specific strategy could be improved and its place in
the global concept for a regional policy for the German regions bordering on Poland will be
discussed in more detail.
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Appendix: Calculation of the coefficient of specialisation (see Schätzl 1994, 65):
The coefficient of specialisation CSi compares the concentration of m industries in a sub-region i with
the concentration of these industries in the macro-region to which i belongs. The smallest value 0
points to a complete congruence of the industrial structure of the sub-region with that of the macro-
region. The closer CSi gets to 1, the more specialised the sub-region is.
The method of calculation is as follows:









































Total employment in the macro-region